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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D SQUADRON, 5TH CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96383

AVDE-CT

9 June 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Commanding Officer
3d Brigade 101st Abn Div
(Airmobile)

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to describe the events of 9 Jun 69 in the AO of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry.
2. The sequence of events, based on the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry TOC Log, is at Tab A. In retrospect it appears that the enemy attack at 0740 hours was designed to draw reaction forces from Bastogne to the east to facilitate the main attack west of Bastogne (vic YD603080). However, a C Troop Platoon remained at Bastogne during the contact at 0740 hours and was thus available for commitment west of Bastogne. An A Troop Platoon bringing an infantry platoon to the initial contact area was at Bastogne when the second attack commenced at 1145 hours. This element, along with a tank platoon from C Co 2/34 Armor, was available for immediate commitment. The mortar attack on Bastogne was probably intended to hold reaction forces at Bastogne, but never played any role in the action because of the prompt countermortar fire executed on and south of hill 342 (vic YD634076). The reaction forces to the attack were thus three cavalry platoons, one infantry platoon and one tank platoon. A high volume of suppressive fire was laid down on both sides of the road vicinity of the attack site and Air Cav, ARA, TAC Air and Artillery was used to support the infantry sweep. The results of the contacts are shown below:

10 NVA KIA (BC)

(1) 12.7 AA weapon

5 AK-47's

10 RPG rounds

1 Map, 1 letter, 2 photos

Miscellaneous other equipment detailed
at TAB B

3 US KIA (EM, 27th Eng)

16 US MIA (lightly wounded)

(4) 5 ton trucks destroyed

3. Security along route 547 is provided by: (1) convoy escort by tracked vehicles; (2) prepositioning tracked vehicles in overwatching positions which are changed hourly; (3) visual reconnaissance by Air Cav elements and; (4) personal LOH reconnaissance. I believe this approach is fundamentally sound. I further believe the reaction forces reacted promptly and violently to the situation. The area for improvement lies in effecting coordination with the engineer elements to insure that the optimum distribution of security is made and to insure that engineers follow rudimentary security procedures. It has been SOP for all convoys, regardless of size, to be escorted along rte 547 by a minimum of two tracked vehicles (TAB C). However, establishing MP checkpoints and close liaison with the engineer elements has proven insufficient. The three engineer 5 ton trucks that were attacked were moving east from Cannon to Bastogne to pick up road building materials. These vehicles were unescorted and were moving without the knowledge of the unit charged with security along route 547. The ammunition resupply convoy that was ordered to remain at Bastogne for cavalry security moved out with its own and MP security only. The last truck in that convoy was hit by an RPG. Two of the three engineer KIA's were sitting on a culvert without wearons, steel helmets, or flak jackets when they were struck by RPG's. None of the engineers in the 5 ton trucks had steel helmets or flak jackets and most of their wounds were from RPG fragments. It is recognized that no security system, short of utilizing prohibitively large infantry forces near route 547, can prevent the enemy from initiating these attacks. At any one time there are some 30 dump trucks, numerous graders, 2 loaders and a dozen work sites in progress along the road. Security for each vehicle would slow the engineer effort unacceptably. However, the presence of tracked vehicle security along the route, will have some deterrent effect and in those instances where the enemy chooses to attack vehicles with cavalry escort, he will be fought and fixed until additional assets can be committed. The CO, 27th Engineer Battalion has agreed to my Troop Commanders physically restraining engineers from departing their vehicles if they have weapons, ammunition, steel helmets and flak jackets. This will minimize losses during the initial minutes when security elements are reacting to an enemy contact.

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DOD DIR 520010

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1 A/C 3

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Thomas E. Carpenter III
THOMAS E. CARPENTER III
LTC, Armor
Commanding

TABS A Sequence of Events

- b Detailed list of equipment captured
- c LOI, Fire Base and Convoy Procedures

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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS DECLASSIF-
IED AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS CONCERNING ENEMY ACTIVITY ON 09 JUNE 1969

- 0740 1C/3-5 (-) returning to Bastogne from minesweep to east had two RPG's fired at vehicles (18 and 12) by unknown size enemy. Negative hits. A Pink Team was requested by S3 Air, 3/5 Cav. Pink Team came on station at 0750H. 1C/3-5 put suppressive fire into area (YD637096).
- 0835 Trp C 3/5 (-) enroute to area of contact. C/3-5 (-) is preparing to put discounts into area.
- 0840 Fresh footprints found on trail YD635105. 3A/2-327 is being moved to area of contact by 2A/3-5.
- 0923 1C/3-5 on ground sweeping area vic YD623100.
- 0945 1C/3-5 spotted 2 enemy on ground. Enemy had been killed by 90mm and Cal .50. Results 2 KIA (5' 4", 120 lbs, were wearing brown shorts and shirts, age 20-21 yrs). 2 AK-47, 7 full AK mag, 5 RPG 7 rockets (2 fired, 3 new), webgear.
- 0948 1C/3-5 spotted two more enemy and flushed them toward 2C/3-5 who was located on the road.
- 1105 2A/3-5 instructed by S3 to drop 3A/2-327 at Bastogne and then secure convoy.
- 1110 S3 instructed 2A/3-5 to take 3A/2-327 to contact site and then return to Bastogne to secure convoy.
- 1145 Three Engineer 5 ton trucks moving east along 547 were attacked by an estimated enemy plt.
- 1150 2A/3-5 from Bastogne reacting to the attack.
- 1159 S3 3/5 Cav reports IOH shot down. No casualties.
- 1200 C 2/34 instructed to react from LZ Ann with a plt of tanks.
- 1211 9 Trp C instructed to mount up 3A/2-327 and move them to second area of contact.
- 1255 C 2/34 has 3 tanks at contact site and 2 more on the way.
- 1255 TAC Air requested for grid YD600088.
- 1300 FCL established on road. (Arty to south and ARA/Tac Air to North).
- 1306 S3 charges C 2/34 and 2A/3-5 with responsibility for escorting convoy to LZ Ann then to Blaze.
- 1325 TAC Air on station and utilized vic YD600088.
- 1331 Trp C reports 10 rds 82mm incoming on Bastogne. One man lightly wounded (No medevac.) Counter mortar fired by mortars at Bastogne and artillery from Blaze.
- 1445 Convoy closes Blaze.
- 1510 3A/2-327 (grid YD597094) receiving S/A fire from NW, three personnel wounded (No medevac). 3A/2-327 close contact area 2 NVA KIA. Found NVA wallet w/pictures and NVA money on bodies.
- 1516 Trp C found one NVA KIA and one PW wounded (YD607080), 1 AK-47. (1530H PW died). Results 2 NVA KIA.
- 1531 (1433H) C Co 2/34 Armor reports one tank slid off road YD575059. Two injured EM medevaced.
- 1540 Trp C found 2 more NVA KIA (YD607080).

TAB A

**DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS DECLASSIF.
IED AFTER 12 YRS
DOD DIR 5200.10**

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1649
area.

S3 S/3 Cav reports total NVN KIA (BC) 8 vic second contact

1715

1st LZ for B/2-501

1811

B/2-501 LZ complete

1908
respectively.

CO 3/5 Cav reports FZ and LZ times of B/2-501 are 1904 and 1907

1947

CO 3/5 Cav reports insertion of D/3-187 completed.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YR
INTERVALS DECLASSIFIED
AFTER 12 YRS
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ITEMS CAPTURED BY TROOP C VIC YD#03080

(1) 12.7 AA MG #101663 RP 46
3 AK-47 #1963 3440, 51057, 5001572
7 RPG rounds
1 RPG launcher 808970
11 AK-47 magazines 7 full, 4 empty
3 pr Ho Chi Minh Sandals
7 Chicom grenades
4 RPG - 7 boosters
3 boxes MG ammo 1 full, 1 half full, 1 empty
2 back packs (basket type)
4 hammocks
4 plastic ponchos
6 pr trousers (OD)
3 handkerchiefs
3 plastic packs
3 bags rice approx 8 lbs total (uncooked)
2 bags salt
(2) 1st aid kits
7 towels
4 rice bowls
1 powdered milk can used for cooking
1 embroidered handkerchief
1 letter dated 15 Jan 1969
9 sheets writing paper
2 photos
1 fountain pen
1 pencil
6 small plastic bags
1 comb in shape of plane
2 NVA 10 P bills
1 NVA 5 P bill
1 NVA 2 P bill
1 NVA 1 P bill
6 hand - written documents
1 NVA postage stamp
1 cooking pot
4 shirts (OD)
1 pr OD socks
2 NVA pith helmets
3 pr shorts
1 pr gloves
3 plastic belts
2 pieces of parachute OD
3 NVA canteens
1 NVA pistol belt with grenade pouches and harness
4 tooth brushes
3 bags cooked rice (1 lb each)
1 ruptured cartridge extractor, hammer and cleaning rod in tool roll
1 spoon

TAB B

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 3D SQUADRON 5TH CAVALRY
APO San Francisco 96370

AMDE-OT

20 May 1960

SUBJECT: LOI, Fire Base and Convoy Procedures

TO: See Distribution

1. The following procedures will be adhered to by tenant units at FB Pastome, IZ Ann, FB Haze, FB Cannon, or units passing through the area of operations of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry:

a. Convoy:

(1) All convoys originating from outside the area of operations will report to the Military Police control point at Birmingham giving the number of vehicles by type, ST time, destination and any other information relevant to convoy security. If contact is not made with MP personnel at Birmingham, convoy elements will halt at Pastome and coordinate with the CO, C Troop, 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry.

(2) The control of convoy movement, (rate of march, interval, etc) is the responsibility of the senior man tasked to secure that convoy.

(3) The 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry will directly coordinate all convoy movements with S3, 27th Engineer Battalion to insure road conditions and road construction are duly considered.

(4) The convoy security element will keep a radio on the command frequency of the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry.

(5) Crossing of check points will be reported to the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry Tactical Operations Center.

(6) If a vehicle breaks down along the route of march the following actions will be taken:

(a) A pair of security vehicles will remain with the downed vehicle until it reaches a fixed base.

(b) A report giving location of the downed vehicle, reason for the delay and estimated time when the vehicle will be moving will be rendered to the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry TOC. Radio contact with the TOC will be maintained and hourly SITREPS at a quarter to the hour will be made until the vehicle closes.

(c) All around dismounted security will be placed out to a distance of 50 meters from the downed vehicle.

(7) Personnel will ride with weapons at the ready at all times.

(e) In the event of enemy contacts:

(a) All personnel will immediately return fire and continue to march.

(b) If the road is impassable, personnel in the soft vehicles will dismount and fight.

(c) Immediately a report will be submitted to the 3d Squadron, 5th Cavalry TOC. Reaction forces cannot be committed unless the TOC knows they are needed.

b. Swimming and bathing regulations in nearby streams:

(1) During 0800 - 1900 hours only.

(2) Under watch of a minimum of two armed guards in prescribed areas only.

(3) Nonswimmers will not participate.

(4) Buddy system will be used.

2. Perimeter Security:

a. All newly arrived units will be tasked to null their portion of the security load.

b. The sector commander of the sector in which personnel from new tenant units are posted will:

(1) Walk the sector with the commander of the new unit, clearly delineating sectors of fire, areas of responsibility and pointing out likely avenues of approach.

(2) Establish land line and radio communications with the new unit.

(3) Provide the commander of the new unit with a detailed sketch of the perimeter.

(4) Brief the new commander on emergency pyrotechnic signals, reaction force drills, sapper tactics.

c. Responsibility for manning a bunker includes responsibility for bunker improvement, especially fields of fire, and bunker police.

4. Newly arrived units will immediately plan and execute for internal defense. Priority will be to construct fighting positions near where personnel sleep. (See attached standing order preparation of fighting positions).

Thomas E. Gardner III
THOMAS E. GARDNER III
ITC, Amor
Commanding